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Choose v. Byrne, 91 N.J. 287, 450 A.2d 925 (1982).
Despite the fact that a woman's right to choose an abortion was
firmly established by the United States Supreme Court in Roe v.
Wade, I subsequent federal 2 and state statutes 3 have severely restricted
the indigent's exercise of this right. This restriction has been accomplished through the proscription of funds through the Medical Assistance Program (Medicaid) for both elective and therapeutic abortions.4
The Supreme Court of the United States has upheld these bans on the
use of Medicaid funds for all but life saving abortions. 5 Recently,
challenges to the constitutionality of these Medicaid restrictions have

410 U.S. 113 (1973). This right, however, is not without qualification. See infra notes 3538 and accompanying text.
2 Since September, 1976, Congress has restricted the use of federal Medicaid funds to
subsidize abortions through amendments to annual appropriations bills passed in accordance
with the Federal Medicaid Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 1396-1396p (West 1974 & Cum. Supp. 19751982) (Medicaid). Appropriations are made to the Department of Health and Human Services
for distribution to states whose plans for providing medical assistance are approved by the
Department. These restrictions against federally subsidized abortions, are termed "Hyde
Amendments" after their original congressional sponsor, Representative Henry Hyde (R.-Ill.).
The original amendment provided that "[n]one of the funds contained in this Act shall be used to
perform abortions except where the life of the mother would be endangered if the fetus were
carried to term." Act of Sept. 30, 1979, Pub. L. No. 94-439, § 209, 90 Stat. 1418, 1434.
Subsequent versions of the restriction contained exceptions for rape or incest, see Act of Nov. 20,
1979, Pub. L. No. 96-123, § 109, 93 Stat. 923, 926; Act of Oct. 12, 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-86, §
118, 93 Stat. 656, 662, and for "instances where severe and long-lasting physical health damage
to the mother would result if the pregnancy were carried to term when so determined by two
physicians." See Act of Dec. 7, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-205, § 101, 91 Stat. 1460, 1460; Act of Oct.
18, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-480, § 210, 92 Stat. 1567, 1586. The current Hyde Amendment, for
fiscal year 1983, has eliminated the exceptions in returning to the most restrictive version which
permits funding only if the mother's life "would be endangered if the fetus were carried to full
term." See Act of Dec. 12, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-377, § 402, 96 Stat. 1830, 1894.
3 See Gold, Publicly Funded Abortions in Fiscal Year 1980 and Fiscal Year 1981, 14 FAM.
PLAN. PEisP. 204 (1982). As of 1982, 34 states prohibited indigent women from obtaining
abortion funding by adhering to the federal Hyde Amendment Standard. Ten states and the
District of Columbia voluntarily funded medically necessary abortions. Five states, including
New Jersey, funded medically necessary abortions under court order. Id. at 207. For purposes of
this Note, New Jersey's statutory funding restriction will be termed a "Hyde Amendment."
4 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit defined elective abortions as those "requested
by a woman after consultation with her physician merely because, for whatever reason, she does
not wish to bear the child." Roe v. Norton, 522 F.2d 928, 932 (2d Cir. 1975), rev'd sub nom.
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 474 (1977). The elective abortion, in contradistinction to the therapeutic
abortion, is defined as one "necessary for the health of the patient." Id.
5 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Beal v. Doe,
432 U.S. 438 (1977).
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been premised on the notion that indigent women possess greater
rights and protections under their respective state constitutions than
under the Federal Constitution. 6 In Right to Choose v. Byrne7 (Right
to Choose), the New Jersey Supreme Court recognized that an indigent woman has the right under the New Jersey Constitution to a
subsidized abortion to protect her life or health, but held that her
8
rights are not sufficient to secure such funds for elective abortions .
As a result of the revolutionary Wade decision in January 1973,
New Jersey began providing Medicaid funds for all abortions under
the existing Medicaid statute. 9 In December 1975, however, Governor
Brendan Byrne signed into law New Jersey's version of the federal
Hyde Amendment.10 N.J. Stat. Ann. 30:4D-6.1, the New Jersey Hyde
Amendment, prohibited the expenditure of state funds for abortion
unless such a procedure was necessary to save the woman's life. 1 This
statute was more restrictive than subsequent versions of its federal
counterpart which permitted the use of federal Medicaid funds for
abortion, not only if the pregnant woman were in danger of dying,
but also if she had been the victim of rape or incest or would be
2
severely damaged by giving birth.1
A federal district court preliminary injunction prevented the enforcement of the New Jersey Hyde Amendment for seventeen months;
however, the district court vacated the injunction after the United
States Supreme Court upheld similar state restrictions on Medicaid

'

See Brennan, State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90

HARv.

L.

REv. 489 (1977). In addition to New Jersey, the supreme courts of California and Massachusetts

have struck down mini-Hyde Amendments on state constitutional grounds. Comm. To Defend
Reproductive Rights v. Myers, 29 Cal. 3d. 252, 625 P. 2d 779, 172 Cal. Rptr. 866 (1981); Moe v.
Secretary of Admin. & Fin., 382 Mass. 629, 417 N.E.2d 387 (1981). See generally State v. Alston,
88 N.J. 211, 440 A.2d 1311 (1981); State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980).
91 N.J. 287, 450 A.2d 925 (1982)
' Id. at 310, 450 A.2d at 937.
1 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4D-2 (West 1968) (amended 1979) provided that "[iut is the intent of
the Legislature to make statutory provision which will enable the State of New Jersey to provide
medical assistance, insofar as practicable, on behalf of persons whose resources are determined to
be inadequate to enable them to secure quality medical care ....
10 Right to Choose v. Byrne, I, 165 N.J. Super. 443, 449, 398 A.2d 587, 590 (Ch. Div. 1979);
see also N.Y. Times, Dec. 19, 1975, at 1, col. 5.
" N.J. STAT. ANN. 30:4D-6.1 (West 1981) (Unconstitutional in part) provides that:
No payments for medical assistance shall be made under the act hereby supplemented for
the termination of a woman's pregnancy for any reason except where it is medically indicated to
be necessary to preserve the woman's life. In any case where a pregnancy is so terminated, the
act shall be performed in a hospital and the physician performing the act shall submit in writing
a report to the division stating in detail his reason for finding it necessary to terminate the
pregnancy.
12 Id.; see supra note 2.
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funding for elective abortions.13 Thereafter, the plaintiffs, 4 in Right
to Choose v. Byrne15 (Right to Choose I), brought suit in the Superior
Court, Chancery Division for state injunctive relief.' 6 The plaintiff's
challenge was based on two theories: that New Jersey's Hyde Amendment prevented the state from meeting its obligation under the Federal Medicaid Act,' 7 and that the statute violated the due process,
equal protection, and establishment of religion clauses of the Federal
and state constitutions and the free exercise clause of the United States
Constitution.' 8 While not deciding the plaintiffs due process or equal
protection claims,' Judge Furman found that the New Jersey statute
conflicted with the Medicaid Act. He then enjoined the state from
enforcing section 30:4D-6.1 and ordered the New Jersey Department
of Human Services to issue20 new guidelines for the funding of "medically necessary" abortions.

13 Right to Choose v. Byrne, I, 165 N.J. Super. 443, 449, 398 A.2d 587, 590 (Ch. Div. 1979).
The injunction was issued on March 18, 1976 and vacated in August, 1977. Id.
4 The plaintiffs were four pregnant women, two mothers on behalf of their pregnant minor
daughters, a physician, two nonprofit associations protective of welfare and abortion rights, and
a religious association for abortion rights. They sought funds for elective and therapeutic
abortions. Right to Choose v. Byrne, I, 165 N.J. Super. 443, 448, 398 A.2d 587, 588 (Ch. Div.
1979).
15 165 N.J. Super. 443, 398 A.2d 587 (Ch. Div. 1979).
11 Id. at 447, 398 A.2d at 589.
17 The purpose of the Federal Medicaid Act, see supra note 2, is to enable "'each ... state to

furnish medical assistance on behalf of families with dependent children and of aged, blind, or
disabled individuals, whose income and resources are insufficient to meet the costs of necessary
medical services." 42 U.S.C. § 1396 (1976). The plaintiff argued that the New Jersey proscription
of abortion funding could not be more restrictive than the federal standard which provided
funding for "necessary medical services." 165 N.J. Super. at 451, 398 A.2d at 592. Thus, the
plaintiffs maintained that because § 30:4D-6.1 limited funding for abortions to only lifethreatening situations, it vlolated the Federal Medicaid Act. Id. at 452, 398 A.2d at 592.
I8 165 N.J. Super. at 448, 398 A.2d at 589.
'9 Id. at 445-56, 398 A.2d at 594. Judge Furman found that the plaintiffs were foreclosed by
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977), "'from arguing as a matter of federal constitutional law that
the withholding of Medicaid funding for elective nontherapeutic abortions is a denial of equal
protection of the law or that N.J.S.A. 30:4D-6. 1 lacks a reasonable relationship to a constitutionally permissible purpose or is vague and indefinite in violation of due process of law." 165 N.J.
Super. at 455-56, 398 A.2d at 594; see United States v. Vuitch, 402 U.S. 62 (1971) (rejecting
claim that state criminal abortion statutes violate due process because they are vague or indefinite). But see Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that state criminal abortion statutes
violate due process since they infringed woman's right to privacy). Further, the plaintiffs' claims
that § 30:4D-6.1 established the views of the Roman Catholic Church as a state policy and that
the Roman Catholic Church had become excessively entangled in the legislative process were also
rejected. 165 N.J. Super at 459-60, 398 A.2d at 597.
20 165 N.J. Super. at 454, 398 A.2d at 592. Courts had defined "medically necessary" broadly
enough to encompass services not limited to saving lives. See Doe v. Kenley, 584 F.2d 1362 (4th
Cir. 1978); Zbaraz v. Quern, 469 F. Supp. 1212 (N.D. Ill.)(vacated and remanded, 596 F.2d 196
(7th Cir. 1979), vacated sub nom. Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358, cert. denied, 448 U.S. 907

SETON HALL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 13:779

In response, the Department of Human Services issued guidelines
that mirrored the standards of the Hyde Amendment enacted by
Congress in 1978.21 The plaintiffs in Right to Choose v. Byrne 22 (Right
to Choose II), reasserted their statutory and constitutional arguments
put forth in Right to Choose I in challenging the proposed guidelines. 23 Striking down the proposed guidelines on constitutional
grounds, Judge Furman held that "[e]njoyment of one's health is a
fundamental liberty," protected by both the fourteenth amendment to
the Federal Constitution and the equal protection provision of the
New Jersey Constitution "against unreasonable and discriminatory
restriction. ' 24 The court then ordered revised guidelines that insured
25
state Medicaid funds for all life and health preserving abortions.

(1980); Roe v. Casey, 464 F. Supp. 487 (E.D. Pa. 1978), afj'd, 623 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1980);
Emma G. v. Edwards, 434 F. Supp. 1048 (E.D. La. 1977), af'd, 619 F.2d 557 (5th Cir.
1980)(overruled by Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297
(1980)).
21Right to Choose v. Byrne, II, 169 N.J. Super. 543, 546, 405 A.2d 427, 428-29 (Ch. Div.
1979); see also supra note 2.
22 169 N.J. Super. 543, 405 A.2d 427 (Ch. Div.
1979).
23 Id. at 547, 405 A.2d at 492; see supra notes 17-19 and accompanying
text.
24 169 N.J. Super. at 551, 405 A.2d at 431. Judge
Furman wrote:
The proposed guidelines would discriminatorily infringe upon a fundamental
right, the right to public benefits for the protection of one's health which have been
provided heretofore in general legislation, and may be sustained as valid only on the
basis of a compelling state interest justifying the withholding of Medicaid funding
for medically necessary abortions but for no other medically necessary treatment or
procedure.
Id. at 551-52, 405 A.2d at 481.
25 Id. at 552, 405 A.2d at 432. The new regulations resulting from the injunction,
N.J.
ADMIN. CODE tit. 10, § 53-1.14 (Supp. 1980), provided that:
(a) Effective May 1, 1980, Medicaid will pay for all medically necessary abortions.
(b) A physician may take the following factors into consideration in determining
whether an abortion ismedically necessary:
1. Physical, emotional, and psychological factors;
2. Family reasons;
3. Age.
Despite Judge Furman's order in Right to Choose II,the litigation continued over the issue
of attorney fees. In Right to Choose v. Byrne, III, 173 N.J. Super. 66, 413 A.2d 366 (Ch. Div.
1980), the chancery division ruled that under the Civil Rights Attorneys' Fees Awards Act of
1976, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (Supp. IV 1980), the plaintiffs' counsel were entitled to fees pursuant to
the court's evaluation of time spent on the prevailing constitutional issue. 173 N.J. Super. at 74,
413 A.2d at 370. The New Jersey Supreme Court, however, in Right to Choose denied the
plaintiffs these attorneys' fees. The court reasoned that because it is necessary to prevail on a
federal claim in order to collect attorneys' fees under § 1988, no basis for the plaintiff's claim
remained after Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297 (1980). 91 N.J. at 316, 450 A.2d at 940; see infra
notes 51-57 and accompanying text. Despite the fact that the plaintiffs had succeeded in
obtaining a preliminary injunction, the court ruled that this, like the pendent state claim on
which the plaintiffs prevailed, was insufficient grounds upon which to award counsel fees. 91
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The legal waters surrounding Medicaid funding for abortions in
New Jersey remained troubled as the United States Supreme Court, in
Harris v. McRae, 21 undermined Right to Choose 11.27 The McRae
Court rejected all federal constitutional claims against a denial of
funding for any abortion which did not endanger a woman's life, thus
limiting future challenges of state Hyde Amendments to state constitutional grounds. 28 Thus, in Right to Choose, the plaintiffs were relegated to arguing only that New Jersey's Hyde Amendment violated
the equal protection, free exercise, and establishment provisions of the
New Jersey Constitution. 29 The Right to Choose court held that N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 30:4D-6.1 violated the state constitution's equal protection clause, as a woman's right to protect her health by abortion
30
outweighed the state's asserted interest in protecting potential life.
The legal controversy over abortion, culminating in New Jersey
in Right to Choose, is rooted in the United States Supreme Court
decision of Roe v. Wade. 3 1 In Wade, the Supreme Court expanded the
area of a person's freedom from governmental interference 32 by holding that a woman's fundamental right 33 to an abortion falls within
this protected zone of privacy. 34 Although the Wade Court recognized
that serious harms 35 could result from state interference with a wom-

N.J. at 317-18, 450 A.2d at 941. But see Westfield Centre Serv., Inc. v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 86
N.J. 453, 472, 432 A.2d 48, 58 (1981) (attorney awarded fees after obtaining preliminary
injunction).
26 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
27 See 91 N.J. at 298, 450 A.2d at 930-31.
218 448 U.S. at 311; accord Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 359, 369 (1980).
21 91 N.J. at 299, 450 A.2d at 931; see N.J. CONST. art. 1, para.1 (equal protection
provision); N.J. CONST. art. 1, para.3 (free exercise provision); N.J. CONST. art. 1, para.4
(establishment of religion provision).
30 91 N.J. at 310, 450 A.2d at 937.
11 410 U.S. 113 (1975); see supra text accompanying note I. In Wade's companion case, Doe
v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179 (1973), the Court held unconstitutional specific procedural requirements
which curtailed the availability of abortions. Bolton provided states with guidelines for drafting
future abortion legislation.
32 See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). In Griswold, the Court, explicitly
recognizing for the first time a privacy right, struck down a 1938 Connecticut statute which
proscribed the use of any contraceptive device or the counseling of another in the use of
contraception. Id. at 485-86; see also Union Pac. By. v. Botsford, 141, U.S. 250, 251 (1890).
11 Justice Blackmun wrote "that only personal rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or
'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty' [are] included in this guarantee of personal privacy."'"
410 U.S. at 152 (quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937)).
31 410 U.S. at 153.
11 Justice Blackmun identified "specific and direct harm medically diagnosable," "a distressful life and future" due to raising an unwanted child, psychological harm, and "the stigma of
unwed motherhood." Id.
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an's right to procreative choice, 36 it noted that "important state interests" nonetheless qualified this right. 37 The Court made clear, however, that these state interests did not become compelling until after
the first trimester and, therefore, a woman's decision to abort before
this point could not be obstructed by the state. 38 While this decision
established the right to have an abortion, it did not preclude states
participating under the Medical Assistance Program 39 from denying
funds to indigent women seeking to exercise this right. Challenges to
these state obstructions came before the Supreme Court four years
after Wade in the "Medicaid Trilogy" of Beal v. Doe, 40 Poelker v.
42
Doe 41 and Maher v. Roe.
In Beal, the Court upheld a Pennsylvania statute which provided
financial assistance only for abortions defined as "medically necessary" 43 and held that the Federal Medicaid Act did not necessitate a
state's funding of elective abortions as a requirement for participation
in the Medicaid program. 44 The Beal Court interpreted the language

3' The specific provision creating this impediment struck down by the Wade Court was the
Texas criminal abortion statute which proscribed obtaining or attempting an abortion except
with medical approval for the purpose of saving the mother's life. Id. at 164. Therefore, New
Jersey's criminal abortion statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:87-1 (West 1969) (repealed 1978),
which was virtually identical to Texas', was also invalidated. Young Women's Christian Ass'n v.
Kugler, 342 F. Supp. 1048 (D.N.J. 1972), aff'd, 493 F.2d 1402 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 415 U.S.
989 (1974).
11 410 U.S. at 154-55. During the second trimester, the state's interest in protecting the
mother's health becomes compelling and the state may regulate the abortion procedure to
protect that interest. Id. at 163. The state's interest in protecting the "potential life" of the fetus
reaches the compelling point at viability, usually at about seven months. Id. at 160. 164-65.
Beyond the point of viability, a state may prohibit all abortions except those necessary to save the
mother's life. Id. at 164-65.
31 Id. at 163. Even at this point, however, the Wade Court did not appear to grant the
woman the sole decision: "For the stage prior to approximately the end of the first trimester, the
abortion decision and its effectuation must be left to the medical judgment of the pregnant
woman's attending physician." Id. at 164.
39 See supra note 2; text accompanying notes 1-4. See generally Note, Beal v. Doe, Maher v.
Roe, and Non-TherapeuticAbortions: The State Does Not Have To Pay The Bill, 9 Loy. U. CHI.
L.J. 288 (1977).
-0 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
' 432 U.S. 519 (1977).
42 432 U.S. 464 (1977). For over two years after Wade, the Supreme Court refused to become
involved in the abortion area as litigation mounted. Courts dealing with the same facts and legal
issues often reached opposite results. See Note, supra note 39, at 291 & nn. 23-25.
11 432 U.S. at 447. Under the Pennsylvania Medicaid program an abortion is "medically
necessary" if the pregnancy is certified by the attending physician and two concurring physicians
as threatening to the health of the mother. Also, "medically necessary" includes pregnancies in
which documented evidence shows that the child may be born with physical or mental defects,
or pregnancies resulting from rape or incest. Id. at 441 n.3.
44 Id. at 444.
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of the statute to confer upon the states "broad discretion" to determine
45
the extent of medical assistance to indigents.
In Poelker, the Court found that the city of St. Louis' refusal to
provide publicly financed hospital services for elective abortions in
city-owned hospitals did not violate any constitutional rights. 46 The
Court held that a state or city could express a preference for normal
7
childbirth by denying public funds for elective abortions.1
In Maher, the Court rejected an equal protection clause challenge to a Connecticut Welfare Department regulation, which, like
the Pennsylvania regulation at issue in Beal, permitted Medicaid
funding only for first trimester abortions that were "medically necessary. "48 Justice Powell, writing for the Court, used a traditional two49
tier analysis, and found no discrimination against a suspect class.
Further the Court decided that the Connecticut regulation was not
violative of the fundamental right to privacy recognized in Wade,
reasoning that it did not impinge at all upon a pregnant woman's
right to an abortion.50 The Connecticut statute was deemed to be

15 Id. Reasoning that the state has a strong interest in encouraging normal childbirth, the
Court concluded that Pennsylvania's refusal to extend Medicaid coverage to nontherapeutic
abortions was not inconsistent with the Medicaid Act. Id. at 446-47. The Court stated: "Although serious statutory questions might be presented if a state Medicaid plan excluded necessary
medical treatment from its coverage, it is hardly inconsistent with the objectives of the Act for a
State to refuse to fund unnecessary -though perhaps desirable- medical services." Id. at 444-45
(emphasis in original). Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun in a strongly
worded dissent, argued that there was no rational reason for distinguishing between nontherapeutic abortions, therapeutic abortions, and live births, as all are legitimate medical responses to
the condition of pregnancy. Id. at 449 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Further, the dissent stated that
"'thelegislative history of [the Medicaid Act] and our abortion cases compel the conclusion that
elective abortions constitute medically necessary treatment for the condition of pregnancy." Id.
11 432 U.S. at 521. The Poelker Court rejected the court of appeals' finding that the city's
restriction was violative of the equal protection clause since the restriction resulted in the
creation of two classes: nonindigent women who could obtain abortions in private hospitals and
indigent women who could not. Id. at 520.
4 Id. at 521.
4 432 U.S. at 466. Under the Connecticut regulation, the term "medically necessary"
included psychiatric necessity. Id. at 466 n.2.
o Id. at 480.
o Id. at 474. Justice Powell, writing for the majority as he did in Beal, distinguished Maher
from Wade to demonstrate that the regulation did not violate a woman's zone of privacy. At
issue in Wade was a Texas statute which totally abridged a woman's constitutional freedom by
imposing harsh criminal penalties on physicians who performed abortions, "a stark example of
impermissible interference with the pregnant woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy." Id.
at 472. The Maher Court reasoned that the Connecticut regulation was "different in kind" as it
did not even mildly interfere with the pregnant woman's right to an abortion. Id. at 474. "The
indigency that may make it difficult-and in some cases, perhaps, impossible-for some women
to have abortions is neither created nor in any way affected by the Connecticut regulation." Id.
Justice Brennan, dissenting, found that the Connecticut scheme clearly impinged upon that area
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rationally related to a legitimate state objective of encouraging child51
birth and consequently within the bounds of equal protection.
Although the Supreme Court found that the denial of public
funds for elective abortions did not impinge upon the fundamental
right guaranteed in Wade, an important question remained as to
whether federal or state governments could restrict Medicaid funds
for abortions in circumstances where a woman's health was threatened by pregnancy. That question was answered three years later in
Harris v. McRae.52 In McRae, a divided Court upheld the constitutionality of the Hyde Amendment, ruling that it violated neither the
53
due process and equal protection guarantees of the fifth amendment,
nor the first amendment's establishment clause. 54 The result of this
decision was to validate a restriction on federal funds for all abortions
except those undertaken to save the life of the mother. 55 The Court
also addressed the statutory argument that the Hyde Amendment did
not relieve participating states from a duty to provide funding for

of privacy by "bringing financial pressures on indigent women that force them to bear children
they would not otherwise have." Id. at 484 (Brennan, J., dissenting). According to the dissent,
the majority's position that the Connecticut regulation was not an absolute bar to preventing all
needy women from having abortions was not nearly as important as the fact that the state had
interfered with a woman's choice in exercising a fundamental right. Id. at 488 (Brennan, J.
dissenting).
51 Id. at 475-77.
52 448 U.S. 297 (1980).
-3 Id. at 322. Regarding the due process protection afforded a woman's right to procreative
choice, Justice Stewart stressed that it was not the government that placed an obstacle in the
woman's path to an abortion, but rather, her own indigency.
Although Congress has opted to subsidize medically necessary services generally, but
not certain medically necessary abortions, the fact remains that the Hyde Amendment leaves an indigent woman with at least the same range of choice in deciding
whether to obtain a medically necessary abortion as she would have had if Congress
had chosen to subsidize no health care costs at all. We are thus not persuaded that
the Hyde Amendment impinges on the constitutionally protected freedom of choice
recognized in Wade.
Id. at 316-17.
51 Id. at 319-20. The Court held that the Hyde Amendment did not violate the establishment
clause because it "happened to coincide or harmonize with the tenets of some or all religions.' "
Id. at 319 (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 442 (1961)). Because the Court found
that the appellees lacked standing to bring a free exercise clause challenge, the Court never
reached whether the Hyde Amendment unconstitutionally prevented a woman from exercising
her right to choose an abortion under compulsion of religious belief. Id. at 320. See generally
Note, The Hyde Amendment: An Infringement Upon the Free Exercise Clause?, 33 RUTGERS L.
REv. 1054 (1981).
15 448 U.S. at 325 n.27. The version of the Hyde Amendment upheld by the McRae Court
was the most restrictive, since federal funds were only available for the abortion if"the life of the
mother would be endangered if the fetus were carried to term." Id. This federal version was
identical to New Jersey's Hyde Amendment. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
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medically necessary abortions under the Federal Medicaid Act and
found that since Congress did not intend to burden a participating
state with the cost of fully funding a health service within an approved Medicaid plan, the state was not required to include in its
health funding scheme services for which Congress had cut off appropriations.

5

1

Although the McRae Court recognized that a pregnant woman's
interest in protecting her health was central to the fundamental right
recognized in Wade, it rejected the contention that this right carried
with it a constitutional requirement of public funding.57 Relying
heavily on Maher, Justice Stewart decided that the Hyde Amendment
was similar to the Connecticut welfare regulation in that it did not
constitute government impingement on a woman's right to procreative choice, but rather encouraged activity deemed to be in the
58
public interest by means of unequal funding.
Faced with the identical constitutional arguments as the McRae
Court, the Supreme Court of New Jersey in Right to Choose was able
to draw upon a considerable body of state case law which had developed a constitutional " 'zone' of privacy protecting individuals from
unwarranted government intrusion into matters of intimate personal
and family concern. 5 9 In State v. Saunders,60 for instance, the court
overturned on privacy grounds"' a statute which made fornication a

56 448 U.S. at 303-09. Two federal courts of appeals reasoned that even though the Federal
Medicaid Act would have required a participating state to fund medically necessary abortions,
the Hyde Amendment eliminated this state obligation by substantively amending the Act. See
Zbaraz v. Quern, 596 F.2d 196 (7th Cir. 1979), vacated sub nom. Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S.
358, cert. denied, 448 U.S. 907 (1980); Preterm, Inc. v. Dukakis, 591 F.2d 121 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 441 U.S. 952 (1979).
17 448 U.S. at 315.
58 Id.
s State v. Saunders, 75 N.J. 200, 216, 381 A.2d 333, 341 (1977). Writing for the majority,
Justice Pashman attempted to define the right of privacy:
Any discussion of the right of privacy must focus on the ultimate interest which
protection the Constitution seeks to ensure-the freedom of personal development.
Whether one defines that concept as a "right to 'intimacy' and a freedom to do
intimate things," or "a right to the 'integrity' of one's personality," . . . the crux of
the matter is that governmental regulation of private personal behavior under the
police power is sharply limited.
Id. at 213, 381 A.2d at 339 (citations omitted).
60 75 N.J. 200, 381 A.2d 333 (1977).
61 Id. at 213-14, 381 A.2d at 342-43. The majority in Saunders held that the fornication
statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:110-1 (West 1969) (repealed 1978), violated both the right to
privacy found by the United States Supreme Court to exist in the first, third, fourth, fifth, ninth,
and fourteenth amendments of the United States Constitution, 75 N.J. at 212 n.5, 381 A.2d at
339 n.5, and also guaranteed by article 1, paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution. Yet,
Justice Schreiber, in a concurrence, posited that the court's finding the New Jersey fornication
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criminal offense. 6 2 The Saunders court reasoned that the extensions of
63
constitutional protection to the "fundamental personal choice" of
whether to engage in sex between adults was consistent with the
protection from government interference already granted under the
United States Constitution to the "intimate and personal" choices of
whether to bear or conceive children.6 4 In In re Grady,6 5 the New
Jersey court extended the scope of an individual's zone of privacy to
include the right to voluntary sterilization.", The Grady decision thus
ratified the holding of a lower New Jersey court that a married
woman possessed the right to be sterilized without her husband's
consent .67
In In re Quinlan, 8 the court extended the right to privacy beyond matters of procreative choice to include the decision to allow
"non-cognitive, vegetative existence to terminate by natural forces."6 "
In so doing, the court affirmed the "independent right of choice" 70 to
die by discontinuing artificial life support devices even though one is
"grossly incompetent." 17 ' The court's rationale in Quinlan was recognized by the supreme court in Grady to stand for the idea that "under
some circumstances, an individual's personal right to control her own
72
body and life overrides the state's general interest in preserving life."
Furthermore, New Jersey's recognition of "wrongful birth"7 3 in
Berman v. Allen 74 demonstrated the court's commitment to the notion

statute unconstitutional should rest squarely on the statute's conflict with article 1, paragraph 1
of the New Jersey Constitution. Id. at 220, 381 A.2d at 343 (Schreiber, J., concurring).
62 Id. at 226-27, 381 A.2d at 346 (Schreiber, J. concurring).
63 Id. at 213, 381 A.2d at 339. The Saunders court concluded "'that the conduct statutorily
defined as fornication involves, by its very nature, a fundamental personal choice." Id.
64

Id.

85 N.J. 235, 426 A.2d 467 (1981).
66 Id. at 249-50, 426 A.2d at 474; see, e.g., Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp., 475 F.2d 701
(1st Cir. 1973) (striking down on equal protection grounds hospital regulations barring elective
sterilization).
67 85 N.J. at 248-49, 426 A.2d at 474; See Ponter v. Ponter, 135 N.J. Super. 50, 342 A.2d 574
(Ch. Div. 1975).
68 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 922 (1976).
60 Id. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664.
65

Id.
71 Id. at 42, 355 A.2d at 664.
70

85 N.J. at 249, 426 A.2d at 474.
Wrongful birth is a term used to describe the cause of action the parents of an unwanted
child have against those persons whose alleged negligence proximately caused the birth. This is
distinguished from a claim of wrongful life, not recognized in New Jersey, which is the assertion
of the infant that absent the defendants' negligence he or she would never have come into
existence. See Note, Damagesfor Emotional and Mental Anguish Are Available in an Action for
Wrongful Birth-Causeof Action for Wrongful Life Is Not Cognizable at Law, 10 SETON HALL
L. REv. 952, 952 nn. 7&8 (1980).
74 80 N.J. 421, 404 A.2d 8 (1979).
72
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789

that a woman's
opportunity to abort, guaranteed in Wade, must be
"meaningful. 7' 5 In the same view, the New Jersey Supreme Court's
decision in Doe v. Bridgeton Hospital Association7 6 held that legislatively sanctioned regulations7 7 proscribing the use of their facilities for
elective abortions were inapplicable to "quasi-public" 7 8 hospitals, thus
demonstrating New Jersey's judicial distaste for state action which
79
made a woman's choice less meaningful.
The question of New Jersey's obligation to fund abortions for
indigent women was first addressed by the supreme court in Planned
Parenthoodof New York City v. State.80 Although the court held that
neither the Federal Medicaid Act nor the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment required New Jersey to reimburse Planned
Parenthood for the costs of abortions performed on New Jersey residents in New York before the Wade decision, 8 1 Justice Pashman, in a
concurring opinion, questioned the constitutional validity of New
Jersey's Hyde Amendment.8 2 He posited that the United States Supreme Court decision in Maher had not settled the abortion funding
issue since "[t]he protections emanating from [the New Jersey Consti8 3
tution] can be broader than those in the United States Constitution. 1

75 Id. at 431-32, 404 A.2d
at 14.
Justice Pashman, writing for the Berman majority, posited:
The Supreme Court's ruling in Roe v. Wade, . . . clearly establishes that a woman
possesses a constitutional right to decide whether her fetus should be aborted, at least
during the first trimester of pregnancy. Public policy now supports, rather than
militates against, the proposition that she not be impermissibly denied a meaningful
opportunity to make that decision.
Id. at 431-32, 404 A.2d at 14 (emphasis added); see Comras v. Lewin, 183 N.J. Super. 42, 44,
443 A.2d 229, 230 (App. Div. 1982)("enhanced risks of an abortion delayed to the second
trimester are of such nature and magnitude that, even though abortion remains lawfully
available, the parent is effectively 'denied a meaningful opportunity' to decide whether the fetus
should be aborted").
76 71 N.J. 478, 366 A.2d 641 (1976), cert. denied, 433 U.S. 914 (1977).
71 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2A:65A-1 to-3 (West Cum. Supp. 1982-1983).
78 The Bridgeton court defined "quasi-public" hospitals as those that are "private, nonprofit, non-sectarian" receiving substantial financial support from federal and local governments
and the general public. 71 N.J. at 487, 366 A.2d at 645.
79 Id. at 490, 366 A.2d at 647.
80 75 N.J. 49, 379 A.2d 841 (1977).
81 Id. at 54-55, 379 A.2d at 843.
82 Id. at 56-57, 379 A.2d at 844-45 (Pashman, J., concurring).
83 Id. at 57, 379 A.2d at 845 (Pashman, J., concurring) (citing Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J.
473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973)). Justice Pashman reasoned that the New
Jersey Supreme Court had rejected the concept "that the equal protection guarantees of the
Fourteenth Amendment and those in the New Jersey Constitution are . . . coterminous." Id. at
59, 379 A.2d at 846 (Pashman, J. concurring). He noted that in Robinson, Chief Justice
Weintraub had ignored the federal two-tier test in which fundamental rights are involved and
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Thus, while the United States Supreme Court stopped short of recognizing an indigent's right to subsidized abortions, Justice Pashman
suggested that such a right might exist under the state constitution.
Five years later, in Right to Choose, the New Jersey Supreme
Court took that extra step and recognized the right to an abortion for
84
Medicaid-eligible women whose health is jeopardized by pregnancy.
Preliminarily, Justice Pollack, writing for the majority, focused on the
role of state courts and their protection of individual liberties,8 5 and
observed that the New Jersey Supreme Court had firmly established
that the state constitution may afford the individual greater protection than the Federal Constitution.8 6
In analyzing the equal protection issues,87 the Right to Choose
court employed the traditional two-tier analysis used in McRae but
expanded the McRae Court's concept of "class.""8 Under the conventional approach, only statutes which impinge upon a fundamental
right or a suspect class are subjected to strict scrutiny, 89 while other
statutes need only satisfy a rational relationship to a legitimate state
interest to pass constitutional muster.9" Whereas McRae neither found
a fundamental right to a subsidized abortion, nor recognized suspect
class status in either proverty or pregnancy, 9 ' the Right to Choose

instead adopted a balancing test similar to that subsequently advocated by Justice Marshall in his
dissent in Beal v. Doe. Id. at 59-60; See Beal, 432 U.S. at 454 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
84 91 N.J. at 310, 450 A.2d at 937.
85 Id. at 299, 450 A.2d at 931; see also supra note 6.
86 91 N.J. at 300-01, 450 A.2d at 932. Observing that "[a]lthough the state Constitution may
encompass a smaller universe than the federal Constitution, our constellation of rights may be
more complete," id. at 300, 450 A.2d at 931, Justice Pollack enumerated the various areas in
which the New Jersey Court had expanded individual rights. Id. at 300-10, 450 A.2d at 932; see
State v. Alston, 88 N.J. 211, 440 A.2d 1311 (1981) (standing to challenge illegal search and
seizures); State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 423 A.2d 615 (1980) (speech and assembly); State v.
Baker, 81 N.J. 99, 405 A.2d 368 (1979) (right of unrelated persons to cohabitate in single
dwelling); State v. Johnson, 68 N.J. 349, 346 A.2d 66 (1975) (consent searches); Southern
Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d 713, appeal
dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975) (striking down local exclusionary zoning ordinances that effectively excluded low and moderate income housing); Robinson v. Cahill, 62 N.J.
473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973) (fundamental right to thorough and
efficient education); supra notes 60-72 and accompanying text (right to privacy).
87 The Supreme Court's holding in McRae and the supremacy clause of the United States
Constitution, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, prevented the Right to Choose court from holding that
New Jersey's Hyde Amendment violated the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause. 91
N.J. at 303, 450 A.2d at 933.
88 91 N.J. at 305-06, 309-10, 450 A.2d at 934-36.
89 Id. at 305, 450 A.2d at 934. See generally L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §166 (1978).
90 91 N.J. at 305, 450 A.2d at 934. See generally L. TRIBE, supra note 89, § 16-5.
91 91 N.J. at 305, 450 A.2d at 934; see Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); San Antonio
Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
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majority perceived the class in question to be pregnant women entitled to Medicaid funds.9 2 Within this novel class, the court held that
the New Jersey Hyde Amendment impinged upon the rights of those
women for whom an abortion was medically necessary. 9 3
Realizing that the conflicting interests of the individual and government are often not well resolved by a strict scrutiny or rational
basis analysis, the Right to Choose court employed a middle-tier
balancing test it considered ideal for situations in which a statute
indirectly impinged upon a fundamental right.9 4 The court weighed
the state's interest in protecting fetal life against a woman's need to
protect her own health and her right to procreative choice, and
concluded that the woman's interests prevailed. 5 Conversely, for
elective, nontherapeutic abortions in which a woman's health is not at
6
stake, the court found that the state's interest prevailed.9
The court, applying the federal standard,9 7 held that the New
Jersey Hyde Amendment did not violate the provisions in the state
constitution which forbid both interference with free exercise of religion and the establishment of any religion. 99 The court concluded
that the statute's purpose was secular since its purpose is the encouragement of childbirth and protection of potential life. 100 Furthermore,
the court noted that the statute's consistency with the teachings of
Roman Catholicism and other religions did not necessarily make its
principal effect religious.' 0' The Right to Choose court defended the
right of religious groups to pressure legislators, noting that lobbying, a
constitutionally protected activity, does not in itself create an excessive

91 N.J. at 305-06, 450 A.2d at 934.
Id. at 306, 450 A.2d at 934.
94 Id. at 308-09,
450 .2d at 936. This more flexible approach to the abortion funding
problem was suggested by Justice Pashman in Planned Parenthood, 75 N.J. at 5, 379 A.2d at
846-47 (Pashman, J., concurring); see also supra note 83.
o5 91 N.J. at 310, 450 A.2d at 937.
92
13

96 Id.

" The court noted that its previous holdings had found the New Jersey Constitution's ban on
the establishment of religion as less encompassing than that found in the United States Constitution. 91 N.J. at 313, 450 A.2d at 938. Nevertheless, it applied the federal standard which
inquires: "(1) whether the statute has a secular legislative purpose; (2) whether its primary effect
neither advances nor inhibits religion; and (3) whether it fosters excessive government entanglement with religion." Id.; see Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971). With regard to the free
exercise clause, the court applied the standard set forth in State v. Fass, 62 N.J. Super. 265, 162
A.2d 608 (Hudson County Ct. 1960), aff'd, 36 N.J. 102, 175 A.2d 193 (1961), appeal dismissed
and cert. denied, per curiam 370 U.S. 47 (1962).
11 N.J. CONST. art. 1, para. 3.
11 91 N.J. at 313, 450 A.2d at 938; see N.J. CONST. art. 1, para. 3.
10091 N.J. at 313, 450 A.2d at 938.
101Id.
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entanglement between church and state.102 In answering the plaintiff's contention that the statute tampered with the free exercise of
religion by denying funds to women who believe abortion, under
certain circumstances, to be divinely mandated, the court held that,
while the government may not interfere with the free exercise of
religion, the state is not required to foster religious practices and
03
decisions by providing funding. 1
In holding that New Jersey's Hyde Amendment could be preserved by "judicial surgery," the Right to Choose court considered the
legislature's initial intent in passing the bill. 104 The court reasoned that
because the legislature's primary purpose was to prohibit public financing of abortions "on demand," a return to public funding of
elective abortions would be anathema to the legislature. 105 Thus, the
court assumed that the lawmakers would prefer to see the statute
survive with its coverage extended only to abortions necessary to
06
preserve a woman's health.1
Concurring in part and dissenting in part, Justice Pashman posited that the majority's holding should also extend to elective abortions. 10 7 Justice Pashman determined that the New Jersey Supreme
Court had previously blurred the difference between therapeutic and
elective abortions, 08 and reasoned that there was no medically valid
distinction that justified the funding of one and not the other. 109
Further, Justice Pashman stated that not only does a woman's right to
procreative choice outweigh any state interest in protecting fetal
life," 0 but that the New Jersey Constitution requires abortion funding
for all indigents who so choose."'
102 Id.at 314, 450 A.2d at 939. The Court noted that the Roman Catholic Church was not the
only religious organization that lobbied for the statute and that some Catholic legislators had
voted against the bill. Accordingly, the court determined that the allegations of entanglement by
a single religious group were unfounded. Id.
103 Id. at 314-15, 450 A.2d at 939.
104 Id. at 312, 450 A.2d at 937-38.

105 Id.
106 Id.

Id. at 318-19, 450 A.2d at 941 (Pashman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
108Id. at 320-21, 450 A.2d at 942 (Pashman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
107

Justice Pashman relied on Roe v. Wade to point out the harms beyond those specifically health
related which may result from an unwanted pregnancy. Id.; see 410 U.S. at 153.
10091 N.J. at 320-21, 450 A.2d at 942-43 (Pashman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part); accord Bridgeton Hospital, 71 N.J. at 489, 366 A.2d at 641 ("Medically there is no valid
distinction which justifies permission to utilize hospital facilities and equipment for therapeutic,
but not elective abortions").
110 Id. at 324, 450 A.2d at 944 (Pashman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
"I Id. Reasoning that "[t]he freedom to act is meaningless if it is not coupled with the ability
to effectively enjoy that freedom," Justice Pashman argued that poor women require affirmative
government funding in order to have a "meaningful opportunity" to abort. Id.
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Justice O'Hern dissented, taking a position diametrically opposed
to that of Justice Pashman on the abortion funding issue. Following
the McRae rationale, he found that New Jersey's Hyde Amendment
does not impinge upon a poor woman's freedom to control her own
body.112 Additionally, Justice O'Hern perceived the legislature's distinction between life and health in N.J. Stat. Ann. § 30:4D-6.1 to be
3
rationally related to a legitimate state objective."
Arriving at the "halfway" position of funding abortions when the
indigent's health is threatened, but denying such funds to the indigent
who elects to exercise her constitutional right to abort," 4 the Right to
Choose court rested its analysis on two strong pillars: the right to
privacy" 5 and the "high priority" given to the preservation of
6
health. 11
112 Id. at 336, 450 A.2d at 950-51 (O'Hern, J., dissenting). Justice O'Hern stated: "To
translate the limitation on governmental power to interfere in this matter of personal choice into
an affirmative funding obligation is an unprecedented result." Id., 450 A.2d at 951 (O'Hern, J.,
dissenting).
13 Id. at 336-37, 450 A.2d at 951 (O'Hern, J., dissenting).
14 Id. at 310, 450 A.2d at 937.
"1 Id. at 303, 450 A.2d at 933.
"16 Id. at 304, 450 A.2d at 934. New Jersey courts have historically protected both public and
individual health in variety of contexts. See Right to Choose, 91 N.J. at 287, 450 A.2d at 925.
Recently, New Jersey courts have defined the scope of the state's interest in protecting both
individual and public health by weighing this interest against various other rights. In John F.
Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971), the New Jersey Supreme
Court found the state's interest in protecting life to override an individual's right to religious
freedom in the context of administering blood transfusions to save the life of a 22 year old
Jehovah's Witness woman, badly injured in an automobile accident. Id. at 578-79, 585, 279 A.2d
at 671, 674.
New Jersey courts have broadened the scope of the state's interest in protecting health
beyond life-threatening situations to areas in which the individual or public would suffer
potentially serious harm. In Mountain Lakes Bd. of Ed. v. Maas, 56 N.J. Super. 245, 152 A.2d
394 (App. Div. 1959), the court upheld an injunction restraining a Christian Scientist who
refused to have her children vaccinated from entering them in the public school system. In In re
J.S. & C., 129 N.J. Super. 486, 324 A.2d at 90 (Ch. Div. 1974), aff'd, 142 N.J. Super. 499, 362
A.2d 54 (App. Div. 1976), a New Jersey court restricted the visitation rights of a divorced father
who was an avowed homosexual. The injunction forbade the father while visited by his three
children from being in the presence of his homosexual lover, or involving the children in any
homosexual-related activity or publicity. Id. at 498, 324 A.2d at 97. The order was grounded on
the belief that such exposure might be "deleterious" to the children's emotional or physical
health. Id. at 497-98, 324 A.2d at 97. In Young v. Borough of Somerville Bd. of Health, 61 N.J.
76, 293 A.2d 164 (1972), the Supreme Court of New Jersey found that state sanctioned decisions
by local boards of health to flouridate the public water supply did not deprive any persons of
their personal constitutional liberties by forcing medication upon them against their will. Id. at
83, 293 A.2d at 167. See generally Livingston v. New Jersey Bd. of Medical Examiners, 168 N.J.
Super. 259, 402 A.2d 967 (App. Div.), cert. denied, 81 N.J. 406, 408 A.2d 800 (1979); Muhlenberg Hosp. v. Patterson, 128 N.J. Super. 498, 320 A.2d 478 (Law Div. 1974); Leimpeter's
Disposal Serv., Inc. v. Mayor & Council, Carteret, 121 N.J. Super. 18, 295 A.2d 411 (Law Div.
1972), modified, 125 N.J. Super. 535, 312 A.2d 162 (App. Div. 1973).
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Although the court retreated from Judge Furman's holding in
Right to Choose II that the right to health is "fundamental," 1 17 the
New Jersey Supreme Court's interest in health is the critical element in
its holding. I"8 This ultimate reliance on health, however, is masked by
powerful and sweeping rhetoric concerning a woman's right to
privacy. The court found that under the New Jersey Constitution, a
woman possesses a "fundamental right . . . to control her body and
destiny,""' a right which "encompasses one of the most intimate
decisions in human experience, the choice to terminate a pregnancy or
0
bear a child."12
Nevertheless, the court's holding compels the conclusion that the
right of a woman to make "[t]his intensely personal decision" 121 which
should be made "without undue government interference" 122 is insufficient in itself to counterbalance the government's interest in "protecting potential life." 123 The Right to Choose court perceived govern-

The state's interest in the protection of health and life, however, is not without limitation,
notably when matched against an individual's right to privacy. See supra notes 60-72 and
accompanying text. In In re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super. 282, 382 A.2d 785 (Morris County
Ct. 1978), the court considered a hospital's petition for the appointment of a guardian to consent
to the amputation of the severely gangrenous legs of a 72 year old recluse who wanted to return
to his trailer home and "live out his life." Id. at 288, 383 A.2d at 788. Although the man's refusal
of medical treatment would mean certain death within three weeks, id. at 285, 383 A.2d at 787,
the court, finding the man mentally competent, denied the hospital's petition. The court
followed the Quinlan rationale that "the State's interest weakens and the individual's right to
privacy grows as the degree of bodily invasion increases and the prognosis dims, until the
ultimate point when the individual's rights overcome the State's interest in preserving life." Id. at
289, 383 A.2d at 789 (citing Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 41, 355 A.2d at 664); See In re Conroy, 188 N.J.
Super. 523, 457 A.2d 1232 (Ch. Div. 1983); In re Schiller, 148 N.J. Super. 168, 372 A.2d 360
(Ch. Div. 1977).
"1 91 N.J. at 304, 450 A.2d at 934. Rather than finding a fundamental right to health
guaranteed by the New Jersey Constitution, the majority found preservation of health to be a
"high priority." Id. Judge Furman, in Right to Choose II, held that "[e]njoyment of one's health
is a fundamental liberty which is shielded by the Fourteenth Amendment to the Federal
Constitution and by Article 1, paragraph I of the State Constitution against unreasonable and
discriminatory restriction." 169 N.J. Super. at 551, 405 A.2d at 431.
See 91 N.J. at 310, 450 A.2d at 937. Justice Pollack stated:
Our holding is not that the State is under a constitutional obligation to fund all
abortions. Rather, we hold that the State may not jeopardize the health and privacy
of poor women by excluding medically necessary abortions from a system providing
all other medically necessary care for the indigent. A woman's right to choose to
protect her health by terminating her pregnancy outweighs the State's asserted
interest in protecting a potential life at the expense of her health.
Id.
110 Id. at 306, 450 A.2d at 934.
12o Id.
121 Id.
122 Id.
123Id.
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ment interference as being "undue" solely when the funding
restriction jeopardizes the pregnant woman's health. 24 Conversely,
the court concluded that the state's refusal to subsidize elective abortions, which stem solely from the right to privacy, was not "undue." 125 Thus, the government's failure to ensure the right to privacy,
though fundamental, is not undue government interference. If it
were, then the court would have had to accept Justice Pashman's
position that the state is obligated to fund all abortions, therapeutic
and elective alike.
The centricity of health to the court's reasoning is also demonstrated by the majority's use of two equal protection analyses, the first
of which implicitly recognized an indigent woman's right to health
care. Unlike McRae and Maher in which the United States Supreme
Court found the "indigent" and "pregnant" to be the classes in question 126 and thus not suspect, the Right to Choose court recognized the
27
class in question as pregnant women entitled to Medicaid funding.
By formulating such a class, the New Jersey Supreme Court not only
recognized an indigent's qualified right to health care, 128 but also
enabled itself to find the New Jersey Hyde Amendment to be discriminatory.129 The court was, therefore, able to conclude that within the
discrete class of women who are pregnant and entitled to Medicaid
funds, the statute unconstitutionally denied those women whose pregnancy was complicated by other medical problems, the necessary
30
funds to abort and to preserve their health.1
Further, the use of a balancing test to decide the equal protection
issue also evidenced that the Right to Choose court viewed the statute's threat to a woman's health as determinative.13 ' The court found
that a woman's right to an elective abortion does not outweigh the
state's interest in protecting potential life. 3 2 Only when the state's
interest is balanced against a woman's right to privacy and interest in
33
protecting her health does it succumb.

124

Id.

125

Id. at 306-07 & n.5, 450 A.2d at 935 & n.5.

See McRae, 448 U.S. at 316; Maher, 432 U.S. at 470.
91 N.J. at 305, 450 A.2d at 934.
121 See id. at 306, 450 A.2d at 935; cf. Abrahams v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 65 N.J. 61, 66-67,
319 A.2d 483, 486 (1974) (suggesting "fundamental right of an indigent resident to physical
survival").
121 91 N.J. at 305-06, 450 A.2d at 934.
130 Id. at 306, 450 A.2d at 934.
131 Id. at 310, 450 A.2d at 937.
'2'
127

132 Id.
133

Id.
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Although the majority claimed that the legislature has no general
duty to fund any of the medical costs incident to pregnancy, even
those that are "medically necessary,'

1

34

the Right to Choose court,

nonetheless, adhered to a general welfare rights thesis under the New
Jersey Constitution. This thesis, initially proposed by Professor
Michelman within the federal context,1 35 is that individuals possess a
constitutional right to minimal food, health care, housing, and perhaps education; 136 in short, the "rock bottom prerequisites" for participation in the democratic process. 137 Yet, under this theory, the welfare right does not explicitly exist in the United States Constitution; it
must be "triggered" by state action. 138 Thus, in areas where the state
has already acted to provide people with some form of subsistence
benefit, if the distribution of this benefit is challenged, the courts may
intervene to insure that the government largesse is fairly distrib9

uted. 13

Id. at 306, 450 A.2d at 935.
Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the Poor
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REv. 7 (1969); Michelman, In Pursuit of
ConstitutionalWelfare Rights: One View of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REV. 962
(1973); [hereinafter cited as Michelman, Constitutional Welfare Rights] Michelman, Welfare
Rights in a Constitutional Democracy, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 659 (1979) [hereinafter cited as
Michelman, ConstitutionalDemocracy].
"I Appelton, Professor Michelman's Quest for a ConstitutionalWelfare Right, 1979 WASH.
U.L.Q. 715, 717.
137 Id. at 717, 729. The Michelman thesis has been a subject of heavy
attack in recent years.
Michelman, Constitutional Democracy, s-upra note 136, at 659-60. Six basic objections to the
"welfare rights" thesis are: (1) that the idea of welfare rights is not explicitly stated in the
Supreme Court's decisions; (2) that there is no justiciable standard to determine when the right is
satisfied; (3) that, because there is no such standard, the courts can only enforce these rights by
usurping legislative power; (4) that judicial enforcement of these rights would be undemocratic
and illegitimate; (5) that the claim of such rights are not in the best interests of the rights-holders;
and (6) that the claim of welfare rights subverts the basic liberties of those who are required to
satisfy them. Id. Additionally, Professor Appelton has pointed out that Harris v. McRae has
severely damaged the thesis and its recognition and acceptance by the Supreme Court. Appelton,
Beyond the Limits of Reproductive Choice: The Contributionsof the Abortion-FundingCases to
Fundamental-RightsAnalysis and to the Welfare-Rights Thesis, 81 COLUM. L. REV. 721, 756-57
(1981). McRae, according to Appelton, provided the Supreme Court with an ideal vehicle for
enforcing necessary health care, a key welfare right, arguably recognized, in Memorial Hosp. v.
Maricopa County, 415 U.S. 250 (1974).
38 Appelton, supra note 136, at 722; see also Michelman, Constitutional
Welfare Rights,
supra note 135, at 1012-15.
13'Appelton, supra note 136, at 723. Professor Appelton points out that the need for initial
state action to activate a "welfare right" is a serious problem. She argues if a "welfare right" were
a true substantive constitutional right, it would need no state action to trigger it, rather it would
be "enforceable independent of state action or even in spite of it, but not solely because of it." Id.
134
131
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Although the McRae decision illustrates the United States Supreme Court's retreat from finding a welfare right, 4 0 the Supreme
Court of New Jersey made use of the abortion-funding issue to enforce
such a right in the form of necessary medical care.' 4' The Right to
Choose court reasoned that once the legislature acts by providing some
medically necessary services for pregnant women, e.g., the cost of
childbirth, it must act in a "neutral manner." 42 The court perceived
that this obligation of neutrality arose after state action penetrated the
zone of privacy which protects and surrounds the pregnant woman's
right to choose. 43 The state action "triggered" the duty to fund abortions for those pregnancies which present a risk to the mother's
health.1 44 Significantly, the court considered Medicaid funding "neutral" and not an undue interference if it fails to provide for elective
abortions, thus denying all pregnant indigent women without related
45
health problems the effective choice of whether or not to abort.
Therefore, the Right to Choose court, like the United States Supreme
Court in Maher, viewed a woman's right to privacy in controlling her
own body to be a "negative" right, 46 shielded from state interference

140 Appelton, supra note 137, at 756. But cf. Plyler v. Doe, 102 S. Ct. 2382, 2398 (1982)
(extending benefits of equal protection clause and public education to children not "legally
admitted" into United States).
"1' 91 N.J. at 310, 450 A.2d at 937; see also New Jersey Ass'n of Health Care Facilities v.
Finley, 83 N.J. 67, 73, 415 A.2d 1147, 1150 (1980) (unanimously upholding administrative
regulations which required "nursing homes to make available 'a reasonable number of [their]
beds to indigent persons' as a condition of licensure"); id. at 73-74, 80, 415 A.2d at 1150, 1153
("[all] nursing homes should be required to share in the burden of caring for indigent patients
[as] [p]roperty rights have always been held to be subject to the common good and the public
welfare").
142 91 N.J. at 306-07, 450 A.2d at 935.
141 See id. at 307 n.5, 450 A.2d at 935 n.5.
144 Id. Justice Pollack concluded:
[I]t is not neutral to fund services medically necessary for childbirth, while refusing
to fund medically necessary abortions. Nor is it neutral to provide one woman with
the means to protect her life at the expense of a fetus and to force another woman to
sacrifice her health to protect life.
Id.
145 Id.
148 See Panel Discussion, 1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 735 [hereinafter cited as Panel Discussion].
Professor Michelman defined negative and positive rights:
Negative rights include the right to be let alone, to plan a family the way you want
to, to not take an oath of public allegiance if you don't want to, and the like. Positive
rights consist of claims against other people that they provide you with the things you
need. . . . A negative right does not draw on a limited supply of resources; we can
be prevented from interfering with one another to an absolutely limitless degree. But
the idea of a positive right to a minimum level of health maintenance . . . [or] to a
minimally adequate level of education is highly troublesome and problematic; indeed, we do not want to recognize rights where performance of the duty might itself
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or impingement but which the government has no affirmative duty to
fund, 47 even after entering a woman's zone of privacy. 48 Conversely,
the New Jersey Supreme Court, unlike the United States Supreme
Court in McRae, found a woman's right to protect her health through
abortion to be a "positive" right, 49 one that the government has a
constitutional obligation to subsidize, once it enters the protected zone
by funding childbirth. 50
If health funding is not an explicit welfare right constitutionally
guaranteed under these circumstances to indigents, then its denial
under New Jersey's mini-Hyde Amendment exacts a severe punishment or penalty against indigent women, which the Right to Choose
court found unacceptable. 5 1 This argument, made by Justice Stevens,
who dissented in McRae but voted with the majority in Maher, is
given considerable weight by the New Jersey Supreme Court. 52 Yet
this high penalty rationale is greatly limited by the Right to Choose
majority's concepts of "penalty" and "health." For the New Jersey
court, the penalty occurs because the statute forces a woman to relinquish her health, when a woman's health is not threatened by the
pregnancy alone, but rather by other medical problems in conjunction
with the pregnancy. 53 A penalty, however, logically occurs any time
one is forced to relinquish something which he already has. 5 4 Using
this test, the majority's interpretation of the New Jersey statute forces
a pregnant woman to suffer an enormous penalty when her condition
does not fit within the court's definition of "health" threatening pregnancy. 15 5 Indeed, an indigent woman is forced to surrender her "right
56
to choose" and forced to carry to term an unwanted pregnancy.1
Furthermore, the court's definition of health fails to come to terms
with the physical and psychological problems of any unwanted pregnancy. 517

go beyond the limits of what a general act of free will or sense of justice might
indicate.
Id. at 735.
'7
See Appelton, supra note 137, at 734-37.
91 N.J. at 307 n.5, 450 A.2d at 935 n.5.
'4
See supra note 146.
ISO 91 N.J. at 307 n.5, 450 A.2d at 935 n.5.
Id. at 302, 450 A.2d at 932.
152 Id.
"I' Id. at 307 n.6, 450 A.2d at 935 n.6,
154 Appelton, supra note 137, at 733.
'55 91 N.J. at 323-24, 450 A.2d at 943-44 (Pashman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
I Id. at 323, 450 A.2d at 943 (Pashman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
Is' Id.; see Appelton, supra note 137, at 734 n.96; see also supra note 108.
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NOTES

Although the Right to Choose majority asserted that the statute's
original distinction between the life and health of the mother was
untenable, 158 the court failed to recognize the inherent difficulty in
distinguishing therapeutic and elective abortions.' 59 Thus, the New
Jersey court construed "health" narrowly enough to exclude it from
encompassing elective abortions while asserting that its deprivation is
a severe enough penalty to require the state to affirmatively subsidize
abortions. 60
If the Right to Choose court, in requiring the legislature to
subsidize abortions protective of health, has found a positive "welfare
right," one might question why such a right exists for health preservation but not for abortion despite New Jersey's recognition of a broad
right to privacy. 161 One answer might be that proponents of the
welfare thesis contend that only those particular needs required for
effective participation in the political process are favored. 62 Within
the past decade the New Jersey Supreme Court has ruled that education and housing rights, both of which fall within the scope of the
democratic participation requirement, 6 3 are protected under the New
Jersey Constitution, 6 4 and either state or local governments must take
affirmative measures to nurture. Construing a ninety-eight year old
constitutional provision which guaranteed a "thorough and efficient
system"' 11 5 of public education, the New Jersey Supreme Court, in
Robinson v. Cahill,166 struck down a method of school financing based
primarily on local property taxes. 6 7 The Robinson decision, requiring
that there be equal educational opportunity for children in New
Jersey, 16 8 came in the immediate wake of San Antonio Independent

91 N.J. at 307 n.6, 450 A.2d at 935 n.6.
1 Id. at 321, 450 A.2d at 942 (Pashman, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see
also supra note 109 and accompanying text.
160 91 N.J. at 310, 450 A.2d at 937.
...See supra notes 59-79 and accompanying text.
12 Appelton, supra note 136, at 728.
...See PanelDiscussion, supra note 146, at 735-36.; see Servano v. Priest, 5 Cal. 3d 584, 601,
487 P.2d 1241, 1258, 96 Cal. Rptr. 601, 618 (1971) (education is so "crucial to participation in,
and the functioning of a democracy" that it warrants treatment as fundamental right).
"4 See infra notes 166-75 and accompanying text.
165 N.J. CONsT. art. 8, § 4, para. I provides: "The Legislature shall provide for the maintenance and support of a thorough and efficient system of free public schools for the instruction of
all the children in the State between the ages of five and eighteen years." See generally Ruvoldt,
EducationalFinancing in New Jersey: Robinson v. Cahill and Beyond, 5 SETON HALL L. REV. 1

(1973).
1

62 N.J. 473, 303 A.2d 273, cert. denied, 414 U.S. 976 (1973).
at 508-09, 515-16, 303 A.2d at 291-92, 295-96.
I" Id. at 481, 515-16, 20, 303 A.2d at 277, 291-92, 297-98.
167 Id.
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School District v. Rodriguez. 69 In Rodriguez, the United States Supreme Court, using an equal protection analysis, upheld the constitutionality of an unequal funding scheme quite similar to that struck
down in New Jersey. 70 Recognizing the "importance of appropriate
housing and the long-standing pressing need for it, especially in the
low and moderate cost category,"1 71 the court in Southern Burlington
County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 72 ordered that developing municipalities provide for the "general welfare"'' 73 by using
their zoning power to help create such housing. 7 4 The Mount Laurel
court concluded that "[i]t is plain beyond dispute that proper provision for adequate housing of all categories of people is certainly an
absolute essential in promotion of the general welfare required in all
local land use regulation."'' 75 Therefore, although never explicitly
recognizing a welfare right to housing, education, or health, the New
Jersey Supreme Court has played an activist role during the past
decade in requiring affirmative government action to provide these
essential needs.
Ultimately, the majority's rejection of Justice Pashman's plea for
a New Jersey constitutional right to affirmative government funding
for all abortions may be explained by the court's sensitivity to judicial
legitimacy. 176 After both Robinson and Mt. Laurel, the New Jersey
Supreme Court encountered not only difficulty in effectively implementing its decisions but also heavy criticism for overstepping its
proper bounds. 17 7 As with most welfare rights cases, the overriding
69 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
170Id. at 54-55. Justice Powell, writing for the Court, found that the Texas system of funding
public education did "not operate to the peculiar disadvantage of any suspect class." Id. at 28.
"I' Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 67 N.J. 151, 336 A.2d
213, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808 (1975).
17267 N.J. 151, 180, 336 A.2d 713, 728, appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 423 U.S. 808
(1975).
"I Id. at 174-75, 336 A.2d at 725.
174Id. at 179, 336 A.2d at 727.
17- Id. This broad language may be construed as guaranteeing decent housing under the
substantive due process and equal protection clauses of the New Jersey Constitution. See Comment, Exclusionary Zoning: The Mount Laurel Doctrine and the Implications of the Madison
Township Case, 8 SETON HALL L. REV. 460, 467 n.22 (1977).
176 See Gibbons, The Interdependence of Legitimacy: An Introduction to the Meaning of
Separationof Powers, 5 Sron HALL L. REV. 435, 436 (1974); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 47 (J.
Madison); Note, Robinson v. Cahill: A Case Study in Judicial Self-Legitimization, 8 RUT.-CAM.
L. REv. 508, 521 (1977).
117 See Note, supra note 176, at 508, 514. The initial Robinson decision was met by
both
legislative dilatory tactics and defiance, necessitating five additional Supreme Court holdings
which culminated in an injunction freezing spending for all New Jersey public schools. Robinson
v. Cahill, 70 N.J. 155, 358 A.2d 457 (1976). The Mt. Laurel decision, too, has presented the
court with difficulties in enforcing its decision at the local level, suggesting that the solution to
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NOTES

legal issue in Right to Choose is the constitutional power of the
judiciary to order the lawmakers to spend money for a particular
purpose which the court deems necessary when the New Jersey Con78
stitution confers the power of the purse solely upon the legislature.'
Assuming that there are limits to such judicial activism which conceivably could endanger the court's legitimacy, 79 the Right to Choose
court has avoided confrontation with the legislature over the funding
issue for abortion by drawing a safe line that clearly falls within these
bounds.18 0 Therefore, the reason why health and not abortion has
been included by the New Jersey Supreme Court within its package of
welfare rights may be the court's realization that there are limits to
antimajoritarian judicial power.'"'
The New Jersey Supreme Court's use of a balancing test/equal
protection analysis also suggests that the court is striving for an articulated rationale that is credible and restrained. The use of this middletier analysis, though arguably opening the door to greater judicial
creativity and interventionism, 8 2 in reality enables the New Jersey
court to sidestep the major fear of the McRae majority: that the
constitutional necessity of funding one fundamental right would produce the domino effect of requiring the funding of all rights. 8 3 Had
the Right to Choose court utilized the two-tier approach of McRae,
the result would have been identical to that in McRae unless the court
found a new positive right or created a new class to be afforded special

the problem of exclusionary zoning lies beyond the judiciary's province. Comment, supra note
175, at 471. Like Robinson, Mount Laurel has required further judicial action to implement the
original holding. See Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mont Laurel, 92 N.J.
158, 456 A.2d 390 (1983) (Mount Laurel II).
.. See Hardy, Harris v. McRae: Clash of Nonenumerated Right with Legislative Control of
the Purse, 31 CASE W. RES. 465, 487-91 (1981).
"I See Wardle, The Gap Between Law and Moral Order: An Examination of the Legitimacy
of the Supreme Court Abortion Decision, 1980 B.Y.U. L. REV. 811, 833 (1980). Professor Wardle
contends that judicial activism threatens the legitimacy of the judiciary as an institution unless
two of the following three elements are met: (1) The decision must be supported by an influential
and judicially active group in society. (2) The judicial action must not be perceived by the
executive or legislative branches of government as threatening their authority. (3) The court
must articulate a credible rationale for its action. Id.
,80 Cf. id. at 829. Professor Wardle suggests that the United States Supreme Court avoided a
certain confrontation with Congress by holding as they did in McRae after more than a majority
of the House of Representatives filed an amicus curiae brief which argued that Congress, rather
than the Court, had the power of the purse which included the level of public funding of
abortions.
', See Appelton, supra note 136, at 729.
182 See Yarbrough, The Abortion Funding Issues: A Study in Mixed Constitutional Cues, 59
N.C.L. REv. 611, 625 (1981).
183 Id.
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protection.184 Either of these alternatives not only would have had a
continuing, far-reaching, and powerful impact on the legislature's
purse strings, but also would have made the court vulnerable to
charges of usurption of legislative power and the accompanying loss of
judicial respect. If, however, by requiring that the lawmakers subsidize abortions to preserve the health of indigent women, the New
Jersey Supreme Court has set itself up as a super-legislature, it has not
yet perceived that a woman's right to control her own body is as
important as her rights to health, education, and housing.
George P. Ljutich

Id. The court's recognition of the class in question as "pregnant woman entitled to
Medicaid funding," is arguably a new class, see supra notes 91-93 & 126-30 and accompanying
text, however, it is too narrow to have a sweeping impact on future litigation.

